Energy intensity has declined significantly in four Chinese industries-pulp and paper; cement; iron and steel; and aluminum. While previous studies have identified technological change within an industry to be an important influence on energy intensity, few have examined how industry-specific policies and market factors also affect industry-level intensity. This paper employs unique firm-level data from China's most energy-intensive large and medium-size industrial enterprises in each of these four industries over a sixyear period from 1999 to 2004. It empirically examines how China's energy-saving programs, liberalization of domestic markets, openness to the world economy, This paper is a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The World Bank co-author, Michael Toman, may be contacted at mtoman@worldbank.org. and other policies, contribute to the decline in energy intensity in these industries. The results suggest that rising energy costs are a significant contributor to the decline in energy intensity in all four industries. China's industrial policies targeting scale economiesfor example, "grasping the large, letting go off the small"-also seem to have contributed to reductions in energy intensity in these four industries. However, the results also suggest that trade openness and technology development led to declines in energy intensity in only one or two of these industries. Finally, the analysis finds that energy intensities vary among firms with different ownership types and regional locations.
Factors influencing energy intensity in four Chinese industries

I. Introduction
Since the onset of economic reforms in 1978, China's economy has experienced rapid growth, with GDP (in constant price) growing at an average annual growth rate of 9.7% between 1978 and 2006 (He and Wang, 2007) . Such significant economic development usually drives up energy usage, but China's energy intensity, defined as total energy consumption in physical quantities over real GDP, has steadily declined over the years, on average 3.6% annually from 1993 -2005 (He and Wang, 2007 .
The reason behind this energy intensity decline has been widely investigated and is usually separated into two main contributing factors: structural change and technological change.
Structural change refers to a shift in the sectoral composition of the economy; e.g., a shift away from heavy industry to light industry. Technological change, on the other hand, is related to process changes made at the firm level to improve productivity. A number of market reforms have been instituted in China that have implications for structural and technological change. In 1998, 21 ministries-including industrial sector-line ministries that provide macro-planning for each industry sector-were eliminated by the central government (Naughton 2003) . In 2003, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was formed to regulate China's social market economy and to shift the government's role more toward market coordination (Naughton 2003) . Furthermore, in order to compete with international markets and to capture the benefits of scale economies, China's State Council implemented industrial policies focused on "grasping the large, letting go the small" whereby smaller facilities were either shut down or consolidated with other facilities (Sutherland 2003) . 3 As a result of these policies, selected enterprises in 57 targeted, state-owned industrial groups received preferential treatment, including the allocation of a greater share of state assets within their respective groups, and targeted investment to improve R&D capabilities via a closer relationship with state research institutions. Many empirical studies have investigated whether these policies have contributed to the decline of energy intensity in China. Although Fan, Liao, and Wei (2007) point out that China's energy intensity fell faster prior to market reforms initiated in 1992, they find that the own-price elasticity for energy was positive prior to 1992 and negative afterwards, providing further support that reforms are providing the necessary incentives for firms to reduce energy use in response to higher energy prices. Fisher-Vanden (2009) also argues that China's transition to a market economy has induced a large decline in energy intensity. Using provincial panel data, He and Wang (2007) find that economic transition-including market liberalization, decentralization, and globalization-contributed to provincial energy efficiency improvements between the years 1996 and 2007. Lastly, Fisher-Vanden, Jefferson, Liu, and Tao (2004) , the only study using firm-level data, find that sectoral shift (i.e., structural change) can explain almost 50% of the decline in total energy intensity over the period 1997-1999. Technological change, including subsector productivity changes and R&D input, has been shown to be the most effective factor driving China's decline in energy intensity after 1979. For example, shifting from vertical shaft kilns to more efficient rotary kilns accounted for 21% of the total reduction in CO 2 emissions in the cement industry in 2008 (Rock, 2011) . Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1999) , in their decomposition analysis using input-output tables from 1987 and 1992, find sectoral technological change to be the largest factor explaining the decline in Chinese 4 enterprises' energy intensity between 1987 and 1992. Fan, Liao, and Wei (2007) , using a similar decomposition analysis employing sub-sector data at the two-digit level, find that the efficiency effect contributed more than structural change to the decline in China's energy intensity. Ma and Stern (2008) also conduct a similar analysis but look at the role of inter-fuel substitution in subsector energy intensity decline. Like the earlier studies, they find technological change to be the most important factor explaining the reduction in sub-sector energy intensity from but also find that inter-fuel substitution had no effect on this decline. He and Wang (2007) also
show that foreign direct investment induced reductions in provincial energy intensity between 1996 and 2007.
Rising energy costs throughout China have also induced energy savings. By 1999, the allocation of energy through the state plan was almost totally eliminated (Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004 ), causing state-owned enterprises to face world prices for energy at the margin. This shift from plan-market allocation to market-oriented allocation has led to an increase in energy prices, especially for state-owned enterprises. Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) find that rising energy prices contributed significantly to the decline of firm-level energy intensity, with 54.4% of the decline in aggregate energy-use explained by rising energy costs. Hang and Tu (2007) find that higher energy prices helped to decrease the intensity of aggregate energy up until 1995; after 1995, however, the effects were negligible or even non-existent.
In this paper, we investigate the factors explaining the decline in energy intensity in four Chinese industries: Pulp and Paper; Cement; Iron and Steel; and Aluminum. There are many studies specifically on Chinese industry; e.g., Wei, Liao, and Fan (2007) , Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1999) , Ma and Stern (2008) , Zheng, Qi, and Chen (2011) . Wei, Liao, and Fan (2007) show that China's iron and steel industry has reduced its energy intensity by 60% from 1994-2003, while variation in energy intensity across firms in China's iron and steel sector has become larger during the same period. However, unlike our present study, these past studies employ industrynot firm-level data and are therefore unable to examine what is happening at the firm-level.
In this paper, we utilize a unique set of firm-level data from China's most energy-intensive largeand medium-size industrial enterprises in each of these four industries over a six-year period, 1999-2004. We empirically examine to what extent China's energy-saving programs, liberalization of domestic markets, and openness to the world economy contributed to the decline in energy intensity within these industries. We estimate firm-level energy intensity on factors such as energy prices, technology development expenditures, region, and ownership type, expecting that higher energy prices, technology development (including process innovation and product innovation), more openness to world markets (including regional location), and ownership reform have all contributed to the decline in energy intensity in these four industries.
We find rising energy prices to be one of the main factors explaining the decline in energy intensity in these industries. Scale economies, encouraged by policies such as "grasping the large, letting go off the small" are another important factor explaining the decline within each industry.
However, technology development, trade openness, and regional and ownership differences are only contributors in one or two of the four industries. Additionally, in the case of Pulp and Paper, firms in the Northern and Eastern regions of China have lower energy intensity than firms in the South. In the Cement industry, the energy intensity of firms in the North, East, and South is less than firms in the Southwest. In the Iron and Steel industry, energy intensity of firms in the South and Southwest is less than firms in the North and East.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the relevant energy and development policies in these four industries that might affect firm-level energy intensity. Section III provides a literature review that summarizes previous work on the analysis of China's energy intensity decline, including investigations on specific industries and the overall economy. Section IV presents the data set used in this analysis and section V describes our estimation approach.
Section VI discusses the empirical results and offers interpretation while Section VII provides results from various robustness tests. Lastly, Section VIII offers concluding remarks.
II. Energy consumption and development policies in four Chinese industries
Understanding the factors influencing energy intensity in these four industries in China is important as these industries lead the nation in energy consumption and, combined, comprise a large share of China's industrial output. For example, the share of industrial output from the topten Chinese cement firms has increased from 4% in 2000 to 13.5% in 2005 (Rock, 2011 (Rock, ) and, in 2007 , energy consumption in the cement industry accounted for 5.6% of China's total energy consumption (Cai et al. 2011 ). China's iron and steel industry became the largest producer of crude steel in the world in 1996 ) and, more recently, has become the largest energy consuming sector in the nation. According to Dao (2010) , this industry accounts for approximately 11% of China's total energy consumption in 2010, with coal and gas comprising 47% of total primary energy consumption in this sector.
In recent years, these industries have reduced their energy intensity dramatically-energy intensity in the cement industry fell by 10. 2% between 2002 2% between and 2007 2% between (Cai et al. 2011 while the energy intensity of large-and medium-sized enterprises in the iron and steel industry decreased by almost 50% between 1990-2006 (Dao 2010) . While the output of China's pulp and paper 7 industry doubled from 1995-2005, energy consumption per unit of output fell by 60% over the same period (Zhang et al. 2008) . Over the period 2001-2006, energy consumption per unit of aluminum products and primary aluminum fell by 24.1% and 3.21%, respectively (Xiao, 2007) .
Since the onset of economic reforms in the late 1970s, the Chinese government has instituted a number of policies to improve efficiency in these four industries. A key industrial development strategy introduced in 1997, "grasping the large, letting go of the small," focuses on consolidating and eliminating small-scale operations. The goal of this development strategy is to improve energy efficiency, reduce emissions, eliminate excess capacity, and improve enterprises' technological capabilities. "Grasping the large, letting go off the small" was motivated by
China's desire to create large state-owned enterprises that can compete with OECD multinationals. A key feature of this policy is to give core enterprises in each of the 57 stateowned industrial groups favored access to state loans and state research institutes (Sutherland 2003) .
As a result of "grasping the large, letting go of the small," the number of enterprises fell dramatically in these industries. In the cement industry, the production share of large rotary kilns-based plants reached nearly 62% of total cement production in 2008 and the top-25 publicly listed enterprises with cement as their main product accounted for 25% of total cement production (Rock, 2011) . In the iron and steel industry, it is estimated that the top-10 steel producers will account for 50% of steel production by 2010, and 70% by 2020. Moreover, two of the top-10 firms in this industry will be expected to each produce at least 30 million metric tons while several others will each produce 10 million metric tons (Rock and Jiang, 2013) . The number of large-scale firms producing more than 5 million metric tons rose from 8 in 2002 to 15 8 in 2004 and the production share of these large firms rose from 36.7% in 2002 to 40% in 2004 (Rock and Jiang, 2013) .
In the aluminum industry, "grasping the large, letting go off the small" prohibited the establishment of new small aluminum plants and small primary aluminum producers with outdated technologies were forced to close. The six largest alumina producers produced almost all of China's 6 million metric tons of alumina in 2003. In 2005, the 15 largest aluminum producers accounted for 45% of total production with the 10 largest of them accounting for 34% of total production (Rock and Wang, 2013) .
In addition to the policy of "grasping the large, letting go off the small", the Chinese government established energy intensity standards in a wide range of industrial sectors beginning in the early 1980s. Firms that fail to meet the standards were either forced to pay higher prices for energy used in excess of the standard or were forced to close. The Chinese government also created a large number of energy conservation centers to help firms improve energy efficiency (Sinton et al 1998) .
In addition to policies that target the industrial sector as a whole, the Chinese government has also introduced a number of industry-specific policies that have implications for energy use. For instance, in order to reduce the number of small enterprises in the pulp and paper industry, Technology-related process changes were also encouraged in other industries. In the cement industry, the State Building Materials Bureau in China, in an attempt to improve energy efficiency, has emphasized the conversion from wet to dry process kilns, increased adoption of co-generation, and improved efficiency in the preparation of raw materials (Rock, 2011) . In the iron and steel industry, firms were encouraged by the Chinese government to make process changes to reduce the iron-to-steel ratio, to establish energy management centers, and to utilize more than 50% of waste heat by 2015 (China State Council, 2012) . In the aluminum industry, the Chinese government required enterprises to upgrade to more efficient pre-baked cell production technology or face closure. In addition, aluminum producers were required to upgrade to meet more stringent energy efficiency standards (Rock and Wang, 2013) .
III. Literature Review & Research Hypotheses
Over the past ten years, China's industrial sector has made substantial reductions in energy intensity through the implementation of market reforms. Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) point out that there has been a nearly 70% decline in Chinese energy intensity during the 1980s and 1990s, attributing market-oriented reforms as one of the main reasons behind this decline. Fan, Liao, and Wei (2007) estimate changes in own-price elasticity and elasticities of substitution between energy, capital and labor, and find that accelerated market-oriented reforms have contributed significantly to the decline in energy intensity since 1993. He and Wang (2007) Research and development activities have also contributed to declines in industrial energy intensity. Since the late 1990s, the Chinese government has undergone the process of privatizing R&D institutes. As a result of these policies, commercial R&D expenditures as a share of China's total R&D expenditures has risen from 32% in 1994 to 60% in 2000 (Fisher-Vanden 2009). It is expected that this increase in R&D expenditures will lead to more efficient 11 production processes and, therefore, lower energy intensity. Garbaccio, Ho, and Jorgenson (1999) find that technical change rather than structural change explains most of the decline in China's energy intensity from 1987-1992. Using logarithmic mean Divisia index techniques to examine changes in energy use per unit from 1980-2003, Ma and Stern (2008) also find technical change to be the most important factor explaining energy intensity decline.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has also contributed to the decline in energy intensity. Fisher- focusing on four specific industries which will allow us to examine how the impacts of common industrial policies differ across industries.
Given the above review of the literature and summary of policies affecting firm-level energy intensity, a number of hypotheses emerge which we will test in this paper. We organize these testable hypotheses below under six general categories-energy prices; trade openness; technology development; foreign influence; scale economies; and regional effects.
Energy prices
H1: Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) find that rising energy prices have resulted in lower energy intensity. Prior to the mid-1980s, energy prices were set by the central government. In the early 1980s, tiered pricing systems were introduced where firms were required to sell up to a predetermined quota at government set prices but were allowed to sell above the quota at market prices. To a large extent, quotas were removed and energy prices were liberalized as part of sweeping price reforms initiated in 1993. As a result, relative energy prices have risen dramatically over the last 30 years. Based on this, we expect that higher energy prices will have a negative and significant effect on energy intensity. Moreover, since non-state-owned enterprises (non SOEs) are likely more market-oriented than state-owned enterprises (SOEs), we expect that non SOEs will lower energy intensities more than SOEs in response to higher energy prices.
Trade openness
H2: We expect that China's increasing openness to the world market-beginning with China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001-will also be an important factor explaining differences in firm-level energy intensity in these four industries.
Technology development
H3: As discussed in Rock (2012) , Worrell et al. (2008) , in their study of the cement industry, find that shifting from vertical shaft kilns to rotary kilns (a more efficient technology) and 13 shifting to blended cement together accounted for a 21% reduction in CO2 emissions in 2008.
We therefore expect that technology development activities, including process innovation and product innovation, contribute significantly to lower energy intensities in industries such as cement.
H4: As energy prices rise, firms may respond by increasing technology development activities targeting improvements in energy efficiency. The R&D intensity in China (i.e., R&D expenditures/real GDP) has risen from 0.6 in 1996 to 1.3 in 2003 (Fisher-Vanden and Ho, 2010).
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between the interaction of energy price and technology development, and energy intensity.
Foreign influence
H5: Foreign direct investment (FDI) is thought to introduce advanced technologies and managerial skills to the host country, improving firm efficiency. For example, Mielnik and Goldemberg (2002) find that developing countries with higher foreign direct investment have lower energy intensity. We therefore expect FDI will lead to lower energy intensity in these four industries.
H6: Firms with higher technology development activity are expected to have larger adaptive capacities, 1 which will utilize FDI more efficiently. Based on this, we expect the interaction of technology development and FDI to lead to lower energy intensity.
1 For example, Kinoshita (2001) finds that the learning effect of R&D is more important than the innovation effect. 14 H7: Fisher-Vanden et al. (2004) find that foreign-owned enterprises experience larger declines in energy intensity. Therefore, we expect foreign-owned enterprises in these four industries to have lower energy intensities than other ownership types.
Scale economies
H8: Since larger enterprises have many advantages over smaller enterprises-most importantly, scale economies-we expect that China's policy of "grasping the large, letting go of the small," discussed in the previous section, will lead to lower energy intensity in these four industries.
Regional effects
H9: Since the onset of economic reforms in 1979, the industrial structure in China has become more decentralized, with variations in the implementation of market reforms and exposure to international markets across regions. Given this, we expect firms in the more developed regions, such as the North and East, will have lower energy intensities than firms in other regions.
IV. Data
The data set used in our analysis is the combination of three firm-level data sets collected We then combine the economic and S&T data sets with the energy data set, which includes measures of approximately 20 individual energy types in both quantity and value terms. Merging with the energy data set reduces the number of observations significantly, largely for two reasons:
(1) the energy data set focuses only on the most energy-intensive enterprises and therefore is not as comprehensive as the economic and S&T data sets; and (2) 
V. Model specification
The estimation equations used in this analysis are derived from cost minimization, assuming the following Cobb-Douglas cost function:
where C is cost, Q is the quantity of output, P K is the price of capital input, P L is the price of labor input, P E is the price of energy input, P M is the price of material input, is the elasticity of input X (X=capital, labor, energy, material), and ∑ = 1 = , , ,
. A is the total factor productivity term defined as:
where RDE is the stock of technology development expenditures; T t represents year dummy variables from 1995-2004, capturing the autonomous change of energy intensity each year;
18 OWN i are ownership dummy variables; REG k are regional dummy variables; and FCI is foreign capital intensity.
From Shephard's Lemma, we know that the factor demand for an input is equal to the derivative of the cost function with respect to the input price. Deriving the factor demand for energy:
If we assume = , then the above formula can be rewritten as:
Combining with the expression for A, and taking the log of both sides, we obtain the following:
In order to capture technology development's effect on energy intensity induced by changes in energy prices, we also include an interaction term of energy price and technology development stock in the above estimation equation.
The dependent variable in the above equation is the log of energy intensity; thus, we are assuming that scale has no effect on a firm's energy intensity. In a separate estimation, we relax this assumption by moving output to the right-hand side of the equation, in order to test scale effects on energy consumption: As shown in Table 4 , most firms with only one year of observations are only reporting for the year 2004 since this is a census year. These firms are also smaller in size as shown in Table 5 the mean of gross value industrial output of firms in the balanced data set is five times higher than in the unbalanced data set. The discontinuity of the unbalanced data set across years also implies that we are unable to construct technology development stocks based on continual annual flows of technology development expenditures. Instead, we must use technology development flows rather than stocks in our robustness tests using the unbalanced data set which introduces potential timing and endogeneity issues.
VI. Results and interpretation
Tables 6 through 12 present results from variations on our main estimation strategy. Since it is possible that unobserved productivity differences across firms exist, we control for firm fixed effects in the regression results presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 presents results from alternative specifications for the combined four industries. Across all four specifications, we find that the coefficient associated with the relative energy price is negative and significant which suggests that firms are reducing energy intensity in reaction to higher relative energy prices in support of our first hypothesis. We also find the coefficient associated with technology development to be negative and significant in three of the four specifications, confirming our second hypothesis that greater technology development at the firm level will reduce energy intensity. We also find that the interaction between relative energy price and technology development is also negative and significant. This implies that firms increased technology development to reduce energy intensity in response to higher relative energy prices. These results confirm our fourth hypothesis which predicted that higher energy prices will induce technology development expenditures targeting improvements in energy efficiency.
We test our fifth hypothesis, that foreign direct investment will encourage firms to be more energy efficient, by adding foreign capital intensity and foreign capital intensity interacted with technology development to the regression. As shown in the last column of Table 6 , although the coefficients on these variables are negative (as expected), neither of these coefficients is found to be significant.
Lastly, we include year dummy variables to control for underlying trends unrelated to the independent variables. As expected, we find that the coefficients are all significant and are becoming more negative for each successive year (relative to 1999, which is included in the constant term). Thus, firms are becoming less energy intensive over time due to reasons unrelated to changes in energy prices, technology development, or foreign direct investment.
Possible explanations include process changes and outsourcing of energy intensive intermediate products in response to increased competition from abroad. This provides evidence in support our second hypothesis which predicts that China's increased openness to the world will induce efficiency improvements leading to declines in firm-level energy intensity. Table 7 shows results for this same estimation by industry. In general, these industry-specific results are consistent with the aggregate industry results shown in Table 6 , but lack significance.
Due to the small number of firms in some of these industries, statistical power is limited when firm fixed effects are included. We will therefore also examine results from pooled regressions which do not include firm fixed effects, but include other time invariant controls (i.e., ownership type and region dummy variables).
As shown in Table 7 , the coefficient on relative energy price is negative in three of the four industries but only significantly negative for the iron and steel industry. This implies that higher energy prices induce a decline in energy intensity in the iron and steel industry. This coefficient is positive and significant for the Aluminum industry, which would imply that higher energy prices increase energy intensity, but this is offset by the interaction between energy prices and technology development.
Similarly, technology development induces declines in energy intensity in each of these industries, as implied by the negative coefficient, but this result is only significant for the Aluminum industry. The interaction between technology development and energy price is also only negative and significant for Aluminum. These results, do not overwhelmingly confirm our 22 fourth hypothesis which predicted that higher energy prices will induce technology development expenditures targeting improvements in energy efficiency. Foreign capital intensity also seems to lead to declines in energy intensity, but this coefficient is only significant for the Aluminum industry.
Lastly, the underlying trend in energy intensity is significantly declining only in the case of the Iron and Steel industry, and for the last year (2004) in the case of aluminum. This result suggests that China's increased openness to world markets may have contributed to the decline in energy intensity of iron and steel, and aluminum firms in China during these years for reasons other than increases in energy prices, and greater technology development and FDI. It is well-known that these industries have greater exposure to international competition. This is further evidence to support our second hypothesis Table 8 provides industry specific pooled results without firm fixed effects. Recognizing that not controlling for firm fixed effects will bias the estimators upward, it is still useful to examine the pooled results since it allows us to assess the importance of time invariant factors such as ownership type and region which, in the fixed effects estimation, would be absorbed in the firm dummy variable.
As reported in Table 8 , the pooled results are qualitatively similar to the fixed effects results, although with more significance. A couple of key differences are that the interaction of technology development and energy price is now negative and significant for the cement industry and foreign capital intensity is positive and significant for the iron and steel, and aluminum industries. A possible explanation for this positive result is that FDI is leading firms to take measures to improve product quality which may require a more energy intensive 23 production process. However, the coefficient associated with the interaction of technology development and FDI is negative and significant in the iron and steel industry. This would suggest that firms with higher technology development capacity can employ FDI more efficiently to lower energy intensity. Thus, hypothesis H6, which predicts that the interaction will lead to lower energy intensity, only holds for one industry.
As shown in Table 8 , we find evidence of the importance of ownership type on energy intensity.
For example, in the cement, iron and steel, and aluminum industries, foreign firms have lower energy intensities than state-owned firms (which was omitted from the regression and thus captured in the constant term). This feature holds as well when we pool the four industries. This result is consistent with hypothesis H7 which predicted that foreign and private firms would have more incentive and capacity to lower energy intensity. Chinese firms still lag behind foreign firms in efficiency over the period 1999-2004, as the result of differences in managerial skills and access to advanced technologies.
There are also regional differences in energy intensity in the pulp and paper industry; namely, firms in the Northern and Eastern regions of China have lower energy intensity than firms in the Southern region (Table 8 ). This result is consistent with hypothesis H9 which predicted that firms in the more developed regions would experience larger declines in energy intensity. In the cement and aluminum industries, firms in the East have lower energy intensity than firms in China's other regions. Varying levels of economic development, R&D activities, and government policies may account for this difference.
We further explore how differences in ownership can affect firm efficiency by running these regressions separately for state-owned enterprise (SOE) ( Table 9 ) and non-state-owned 24 enterprises (non SOE) (Table 10) . We find that, if we aggregate the four industries together, the magnitude of the coefficient on relative energy price for non SOEs is larger than for SOEs. This is consistent with our first hypothesis which predicted that non SOEs, due to their greater exposure to the market, would be more responsive to changes in relative energy prices. This result holds for the cement, and iron and steel industries.
To further test our second hypothesis, that greater openness to world markets through WTO accessions would induce Chinese firms to become more responsive to market prices, we also run these regressions separately for the period 1999-2001 and for the period 2002-2004 (Tables 11   and 12 ). We find that The results shown in Table 13 relax our constant returns to scale assumption. As shown in Table   13 , the coefficient on log of output is less than one and significant in all industries. This suggests that larger firms use less energy per unit output than smaller firms. This supports our hypothesis H8 that policies focused on increasing scale, e.g., "grasping the larger, letting go of the small,"
have likely contributed to lower energy intensity in these four industries. However, these scale economies are largest for pulp and paper and cement, and lower for iron and steel, and aluminum which suggests that this policy did not uniformly reduce energy intensity in all industries.
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Another interesting finding is that this scale effect varies over the two different periods. Tables   13 and 14 report that for the pulp 
VII. Robustness tests
To test the robustness of our results, we conduct a number of variations on our original estimation. Our previous estimations were conducted on a balanced dataset, which comprises firm-level data over the period 1999-2004. Using a balanced data set allows us to construct stocks of technology development which, due to difficulties associated with determining the correct time lag for flows of technology development, are better to use than flows. The shortcoming of using the balanced data set is that we lose many observations when we move from the unbalanced to the balanced data set. This results in a much smaller sample size which could affect estimation power and lead to sample selection bias since the only firms in the data set are those firms reporting in all six years.
To see how our use of a balanced data set affects the results, we run the regression on an unbalanced data set. Lastly, as already discussed, we relax the assumption of constant returns to scale in our main results. As shown previously, we find that scale economies matter for firm-level energy consumption. We also find that whether or not we assume CRS, the coefficients associated with the other variables in the regression do not change.
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VIII. Conclusion
Energy intensity in four Chinese industries-pulp and paper, cement, iron and steel, and aluminum-has decreased continuously over the last 30 When considering the effect of ownership type on energy intensity in these four industries, our results are consistent with previous studies on the cement, iron and steel, and aluminum industry; e.g., within a given industry, foreign firms in China are usually less energy intensive than stateowned firms. However, in our analysis, this does not seem to be the case in the pulp and paper industry.
Similar to the regional disparities of economic development that exist in China, there are also regional disparities in energy intensity within Chinese industry. In the pulp and paper and cement industries, firms in the Eastern regions of China are less energy intensive than firms in other regions. These regions are more exposed to world markets which may be inducing process improvements and greater outsourcing. In the iron and steel industry, firms experience large declines in energy intensity after year 2002. More openness to world markets and increased foreign competition are likely explanations for this decline. 
